

Reflections on the Teacher's Tasks: Contributions from philosophy of education in the 20th century

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Introduction

Philosophical reflections on teaching are typically less specific and direct than practitioners might wish, but they are capable of having a profound, often gradual, effect on practice as a fundamental re-thinking of the overall enterprise of teaching, its manner, aims, and assumptions, begins to take shape. Philosophy operates at a certain level of generality and abstraction, to some extent removed from the immediate and pressing problems which beset the context in question. It is worth recalling, however, Bertrand Russell's warning about 'the tyranny of the here and now' from which philosophical reflection may help us escape.¹ Philosophy, said A. N. Whitehead, makes its slow advance by the introduction of new ideas, widening vision and adjusting clashes.² Over time, discussion of fundamental principles, categories and beliefs which structure and define teaching can open the way to a very different conception of the tasks which are central.

It may be useful to consider how philosophers of education, in the twentieth century now drawing to a close, have helped us to think of teaching differently and also, thereby, to teach in a different way. The various tasks facing teachers discussed in what follows, drawn from some of the most influential philosophers of education of the twentieth century, coalesce into an overall conception of teaching which is both coherent and compelling.³ There is no suggestion, of course, that anything like a complete account of a teacher's tasks is offered here. Taken individually, those tasks identified say something important and fundamental about the role of the teacher; collectively, they offer the basis of a philosophy of teaching for the twenty-first century.⁴

Engage in Reflective Practice

Teaching begins to take on a problematic and challenging aspect when, in John Dewey's words, the schools are organised in such a way that 'every

teacher has some regular and representative way in which he or she can register judgement upon matters of educational importance'.⁵ Dewey saw democracy as requiring the free exercise of intelligent judgement, and he thought of judgement as expressing the very heart of thinking and reflective inquiry.⁶ He deplored the way in which subject-matter and methods were dictated to passive teachers by way of officially approved, ready-made regulations and directions, and he promoted the view of the teacher as an intellectual leader and reflective practitioner.⁷

In addition to noting the affront to democratic values, Dewey put forward a number of compelling arguments against any school system which sought to restrict reflective practice on the part of teachers. First, the best teachers will not be attracted to a profession where the conditions are such that no self-respecting intelligence would tolerate them.⁸ Second, unless teachers with enough courage and ability to tackle difficult social and political questions can be attracted to the profession, the schools are likely to produce a passive body of citizens who, like their teachers before them, lack discriminating judgement.⁹ Third, habitual exclusion of teachers from opportunities to exercise intelligent judgement will tend to reduce their sense of responsibility and actually undermine their ability to make good judgements.¹⁰

It would be unfortunate if one were left with the impression that, for Dewey, reflective thinking is invariably explicit, methodical and systematic, reducible in effect to a technical formula.¹¹ Dewey recognised, and has helped us to see, that reflective teaching demands an ability and a willingness to reflect on one's teaching, and to make appropriate pedagogical decisions, in the immediate context of practice, as teaching is occurring. For example, Dewey pointed out that 'even young pupils react in unexpected ways. There is something fresh, something not capable of being fully anticipated by even the most experienced teacher, in the ways they go at the topic, and in the particular ways in which things strike them.'¹² Dewey stressed that he did not mean that all advance planning must be rejected; but if the teacher cannot or will not recognise and respond to the opportunities presented in unexpected moments in the classroom, teaching and learning soon take on conventional and mechanical forms. What we have recently come to call reflection-in-action is vital, where judgement must be sudden and decisive, and where a teacher needs the ability to improvise and invent. Such on-going reflection in the midst of teaching is surely indispensable if we accept Dewey's further observation that 'everything the teacher does, as well as the manner in which he does it, incites the child to respond in some way or other, and each response tends to set the child's attitude in some way or other'.¹³ The teacher must be alert to the ways in which students are reacting as the lesson is unfolding and be capable of

responding, as Dewey put it, 'automatically, unconsciously, and hence promptly and effectively'.¹⁴ The teacher's business, Dewey said bluntly, is to see that the occasion is taken advantage of, and this requires intelligent observation and judgement.¹⁵

Moreover, an almost intuitive sense of the child's educational needs seems implicit in the observation that 'it is the teacher's business to know what powers are striving for utterance at a given period in the child's development'.¹⁶ Dewey's point is that we have to *see* the outcome, we have to *read* the meaning of the child's actions: 'Some of the child's deeds are symptoms of a waning tendency ... other activities are signs of a culminating power and interest; to them applies the maxim of striking while the iron is hot'.¹⁷ The teacher must be able to recognise the difference, and no textbook can provide the answer. Instead, the source must be what Dewey called 'that sympathetic understanding of individuals as individuals' which gives the teacher an insight into what is going on in the student's mind.¹⁸ Greater maturity and experience allows the teacher 'to evaluate each experience of the young' and to determine which experiences are conducive to continued growth.¹⁹ Reflective practice, then, requires the teacher to interpret the significance of what he or she observes, to make judgements about the educational value of certain experiences, and to find ways of creating a vital and personal learning experience for the student.²⁰ It is not surprising that Dewey thought of the reflective teacher as to some extent an artist despite his well-known emphasis on the scientific method: 'And so it is with the artist teacher. The greater and more scientific his knowledge of human nature, the more ready and skilful will be his application of principles to varying circumstances, and the larger and more perfect will be the product of his artistic skill'.²¹

Suffuse Learning with Suggestiveness

Although Whitehead remarked, in the context of a discussion of mathematics, that we make progress by extending the number of important things we can do without thinking about them,²² many of the challenges in teaching which concerned him demand the very kind of reflective judgement and perception suggested in Dewey's remarks about the artistic teacher. For example, the problem of reconciling the introduction of some order into the mind of the young child with the need to keep alive the enjoyment and excitement of learning requires an enormously difficult balance in teaching.²³ Whitehead also thought that teachers need to worry about the fact that, paradoxically, their teaching can be 'too good' in the sense that it presents too much information at the expense of an opportunity for fresh ideas from the students. In his own words, it damps students down.²⁴ The passage of time has confirmed Whitehead's fears that

knowledge would become conventionalised, initiative would be suppressed, and the very tests created to measure ability would exclude recognition of anyone whose ideas lay outside the conventions of learning.²⁵ He urged teachers to be acutely conscious of, and on guard against, deficiencies in the material being taught, and to teach their students to be on guard also. Once learning solidifies, Whitehead remarked, all is over with it.²⁶

One useful strategy in the face of such problems is to think in terms of our having achieved certain half-truths which would serve fairly well as long as we remember that they *are* only half-truths.²⁷ Whitehead himself had grown wary of certitude by the time he came to write his educational essays having witnessed, as he put it, every generalisation about mathematical physics which he had learned as an undergraduate abandoned in the sense in which it had then been held. He observed that 'nothing is more curious than the self-satisfied dogmatism with which mankind at each period of its history cherishes the delusion of the finality of its existing modes of knowledge'.²⁸ In education and teaching, the fatal consequence of such a tendency is to reduce the ferment of inquiry to the dull acquisition of inert, static ideas, the passive reception of disconnected bits of information.

A delusion comes over us that teaching is essentially a matter of imparting exact, clear knowledge and Whitehead proposed, as an antidote, that learning be suffused with suggestiveness so that a deceptive clarity and sense of obviousness would not convert half-truths into supposedly indubitable knowledge.²⁹ Although the value of suggestiveness is introduced in the context of a discussion of university education, it is clear that the idea has general application in Whitehead's philosophy of education which rejects the view that students should first learn passively and then apply their knowledge; the applications themselves are part of the knowledge in question.³⁰ Moreover, the life of the mind cannot be postponed until some future date; whatever interest a particular subject may have must be evoked here and now. To suffuse learning with suggestiveness is to keep alive a sense of what is not yet known, the possibility of reinterpretation of basic ideas, an awareness of controversy, and an enjoyment of surprise; it is also to prevent knowledge from becoming too familiar by continually seeing it in new applications or from new perspectives.

Teachers, on Whitehead's view, have to model, and cultivate in their students, activity in the presence of knowledge; knowledge must come to the students with the freshness of its immediate importance. Robert M. Hutchins was quick to respond that we simply lack teachers with the ability to suffuse learning with suggestiveness in the manner required, and he expressed the fear that, in lesser hands, Whitehead's view would lead to an eclectic, trivial course of study which would mirror the chaos of the world. To which we should reply that our hopes for teacher education should not

mirror present deficiencies in the profession. Whitehead did not disguise the fact that teachers face an enormous challenge in finding in practice that exact balance between freedom and discipline, as they attempt to foster romance amidst the acquisition of definite knowledge. It is immensely difficult, but 'the broad primrose path leads to a nasty place'.³¹

Foster the Wish for Truth

An overriding concern in Bertrand Russell's social and educational philosophy was to articulate and champion an ideal of individual liberty in the general spirit of the values and principles advocated by John Stuart Mill. In the context of education and schooling, this concern translated into the view that children at school should experience a preparation for freedom in the sense that they would gradually become able and willing to exercise freedom of choice.³² Russell urged that students encounter the kind of teaching in school which would enable them to form a reasonable judgement on controversial issues, though it was clear to him that this is inevitably a somewhat utopian aim.³³ Nevertheless, Russell's ideal school is one in which both teachers and students exercise freedom of opinion and in which open discussion of any controversial question flourishes. As a new century dawns, it is clear that we are still a very long way from achieving this ideal, and not everyone would endorse it. It is a tribute, however, to the work of Russell and subsequent philosophers of education that we now pay more than lip-service to this aspect of teaching, and the case for it is much better understood.

Russell's chief target is the idea, in reality a form of miseducation, that the teacher's task is one of implanting 'truths' in the minds of students in such a way that it would be difficult if not impossible ever to question those ideas or even to imagine that they might be questioned.³⁴ This practice was so prevalent, in Russell's view, that he was driven to declare that the world would be a better place if State education had never been established. Of course, evidence, information, facts and knowledge are all vital if our views are to amount to more than unsupported opinion; and Russell certainly wanted students to become acquainted with the best available evidence and information.³⁵ An all-important qualification, however, rests on an underlying epistemological conviction, which might be termed fallibilism, namely the idea that our beliefs are not certain but possibly mistaken. Students, therefore, need to develop the ability to weigh the evidence, to consider counterevidence, to assess the impartiality of claims, to practice constructive doubt, and to distinguish between genuine and sham expertise. Russell concluded that truthfulness rather than truth ought to guide teaching: 'Education ought to foster the wish for truth, not the conviction that some particular creed is the truth'.³⁶

What he had in mind was a genuine commitment on the part of teachers and students to thought and inquiry which would include: developing the habit of forming one's views on the basis of evidence; being ready to accept new evidence against existing beliefs; and proportioning the degree of one's conviction in accordance with the weight of evidence.³⁷ A consequence of this is that intellectual honesty and open-mindedness are crucial qualities in teachers if they are to inculcate in their students a sense that final truth is unattainable but that approximate truth *is* attainable and worth striving for. Russell made it clear that he was not advocating an intellectual shrugging of the shoulders; skepticism about dogma should involve an active search for better ideas.³⁸ Recent writers have identified a further threat to Russell's ideal, pointing out that many students may indeed be indifferent to the wish for truth, and thus reluctant to engage in critical thinking, because they have been persuaded that everyone is simply entitled to believe what they will.³⁹ The result is not so much a lazy skepticism as a kind of complacent confidence on the part of students that they already possess the truth, *their* truth, making genuine inquiry and discussion pointless. Ironically, of course, it has become fashionable in recent years, even in philosophy, to dismiss ideals such as the wish for truth as illusory,⁴⁰ and the task which Russell set for teachers remains as necessary and as challenging as ever.⁴¹

Make Students Puzzled

In a fine discussion of critical thinking, John Passmore, like Russell, draws attention to questions and issues where the answer is not known to anyone, to controversial matters where only further inquiry will produce an answer if one can be found at all.⁴² The teacher can be helpful, of course, in introducing students to strategies, principles and examples which they can draw on in tackling such problems, but the students are, to some extent, on their own. It is certain that students will encounter, no doubt are already encountering, controversial questions where they will need to be able to think the matter through for themselves; and thus facing such questions at school is an excellent preparation for an uncertain future. As Passmore has remarked, 'one thing we can say with confidence about the twenty-first century: it will be different from the present century in ways we cannot now predict'.⁴³

An emphasis on trying to prepare students for the unknown explains one central methodological tactic which he recommends to teachers: wherever possible and as soon as possible, substitute problems for exercises.⁴⁴ By a problem, Passmore means a situation in which the student is obliged to think out what rule applies in the case, or how a certain rule which is known to be relevant is to be applied. The student does not immediately see

how to make use of what he or she knows; critical and imaginative reflection is necessary. Such reflection needs to begin as early as possible in school, interwoven with the acquisition of information, habits and skills.

Passmore's conclusion is that one of the educator's tasks is to make students puzzled, an observation which, in my own experience, itself continues to puzzle many student teachers.⁴⁵ Indeed, Passmore goes further, commenting that unless students leave school puzzled, their teachers have failed as educators. This does not mean, as Passmore makes clear, that it is a virtue in teachers that they leave students confused and merely bewildered. Rather, he has in mind students sensing that something is problematic and being caught up in wondering how the matter can be resolved.⁴⁶ To be puzzled is to have one's curiosity aroused because something is unexpected, unclear, or in some way unusual, such that customary behaviour, beliefs and assumptions are disturbed. As Passmore puts it elsewhere, being puzzled is a special sort of not knowing, not knowing 'what to make of' a situation;⁴⁷ it is to be in search of that which will explain or make sense of what is puzzling. It captures an important aspect of the wish for truth. When student teachers are initially puzzled by Passmore's comment, it is because it runs counter to an unexamined assumption that it is the task of teachers to resolve their students' puzzlement, to explain to them what they find puzzling.⁴⁸ Sometimes, this *is* their task; but it is vital for teachers to realise that this cannot be a complete account of their role. Leaving student teachers to puzzle over Passmore's point may help them to see the role of the teacher as more problematic than they had anticipated, and to begin to see the pedagogical value of puzzlement itself.

Risk One's Own Judgements

In each of the tasks examined thus far, there is an element of risk for the teacher. To engage in reflective practice is to risk adverse consequences if one's considered view leads to a decision which runs counter to conventional wisdom. The temptation to keep to the safe and sure path in teaching is powerful. To suffuse learning with suggestiveness, or to foster the wish for truth, will lead one to inquire into issues where others may feel that inquiry is unnecessary, inappropriate or harmful. A recent example would be the backlash against teachers who inquire into topics which may lead to negative conclusions being drawn by their students about actions taken by various institutions and organisations in their own society, thereby supposedly undermining that civic pride and respect for one's country which is commonly taken to be an aim of education. To make students puzzled is to risk the anger and consternation of students, and their parents, who demand to know why the teacher is not providing the

answers he or she is supposed (and paid) to know, a reaction which is not unknown even at the university level.

Israel Scheffler suggests a further task for teachers which also carries with it uncertainty and vulnerability. Scheffler's conception of teaching is one in which the ideals of genuine inquiry and rationality are paramount. It is an account which places ethical constraints on the *manner* in which teaching is conducted: first, when teachers try to get students to believe certain things, the reasons offered must be the teachers' *own* reasons in the sense that they themselves accept the cogency of those reasons; second, teachers must be willing to have their reasons challenged and evaluated by the students as the latter develop their own, independent judgement. The task for the teacher is 'to reveal, and hence to risk, his own judgements and loyalties in the process of teaching others'.⁴⁹ Teaching requires us 'to reveal our reasons to the student and, by so doing, to submit them to his evaluation and criticism'.⁵⁰

The teacher's opinions and claims to knowledge are put at risk because teaching is not identified with the authoritative presentation of ideas for uncritical acceptance, but viewed as a process of inquiry, involving dialogue and questioning, in which the students' own assessment of the ideas is encouraged, respected, and taken into account.⁵¹ The students' contributions must be actively welcomed, not grudgingly tolerated, if the notion of a *right* to ask for reasons is to be taken seriously in practice. In some teaching contexts, no doubt, the actual risk the teacher encounters is slight because the evidence for the claims in question is very strong, or because the students have not yet developed the skills, dispositions and attitudes needed to raise searching objections. Nevertheless, vulnerability in principle is vital if teachers are to acknowledge, and to be seen to acknowledge, the dependency of claims to knowledge on reasons and evidence, their own limited expertise, and the possibility of error, in their attempt to promote an appropriate orientation in students to the process of inquiry. Scheffler notes that in accepting the risk, the teacher gains in self-awareness and a more reflective attitude towards his or her underlying assumptions.

Perhaps the main intellectual virtue required by a teacher who accepts the responsibility of risking his or her beliefs is open-mindedness. In recent years, this virtue has been thought by many to require neutrality in teaching, where the teacher's own views and commitments are not disclosed to the students; the teacher, in this conception, facilitates a discussion without being an active participant in the sense of defending a particular point of view. As a strategy designed to prevent students from merely adopting the teacher's views in an unreflective manner, such pedagogical neutrality is sometimes desirable, especially early on in the discussion when

alternative possibilities are being explored. Open-mindedness in teaching, however, does not necessitate this kind of self-censorship on the part of the teacher. It is important and desirable at times for teachers to claim that such and such are good reasons for drawing certain conclusions, holding certain views, and so on, and a willingness on the part of the teacher to change his or her mind in the light of objections can be demonstrated even though he or she has ventured an opinion. This is a particularly telling lesson about open-mindedness for students, because it takes considerable courage to admit that one is mistaken, or having second thoughts, in a context where such an admission may, however inappropriately, invite the charge of incompetence and where many of one's colleagues would never admit to error or doubt. The risks here need to be faced, however, if teachers are to show by example what it means to be committed to intellectual honesty in inquiry and thereby encourage their students to take risks also.

Transcend Mere Instruction

One principal form of pedagogical honesty, closely connected to the virtue of humility, is that which recognises limits to one's own knowledge and understanding and limits to the advice and help one can offer others. Paulo Freire emphasised this point by way of responding to the criticism that he himself had presented universal remedies to problems which take very different forms in different contexts, and that he had little to say about the 'specificities' of important educational issues as they occur in particular places. Freire insisted that he did not set out to provide recipes for teachers in the form of definite methods and techniques which can simply be imported into various contexts. To pretend otherwise would be simply dishonest in the absence of sufficient knowledge about the context in question. Freire stressed that he needed to be 'reinvented and re-created according to the demands—pedagogical and political demands—of the specific situation'.⁵² He had little time for those he labeled 'Freirean tourists' who used his ideas superficially. The notion of reinvention implies that educators must discover what, if anything, Freire's ideas can say to them in their own context; his writings, like all texts, must not be approached as frozen in time but as a vehicle for dialogue and reflection.

These self-reflective remarks, and the concept of reinvention, serve to illuminate Freire's view that 'teachers have to transcend their merely instructive task and to assume the ethical posture of a mentor who truly believes in the total autonomy, freedom and development of those he or she mentors'.⁵³ It is important to be clear at once that Freire is not suggesting, any more than Dewey, Whitehead, Russell, Passmore or Scheffler, that the presentation and acquisition of content knowledge and technical ability is

unimportant. To transcend is not to abandon. Freire remarked that it is absurd to deny students the knowledge they need to survive.⁵⁴ He maintained, perhaps surprisingly, that students need to be taught the 'standard' form of the language even though that dominant form is impregnated with ideology and power. Without a command of elite usage, students will simply not possess the skills they need to engage in critical reflection on the condition of their society.⁵⁵ Similarly, there is no suggestion that in 'transcending their merely instructive task', the teacher's own knowledge is unimportant. Freire said bluntly, 'if I don't know, I cannot be a teacher'.⁵⁶ As teachers, 'we must become prepared, competent, capable. We should not frustrate those students who come to us hoping for answers to their expectations, to their doubts, to their desire to know'.⁵⁷

For Freire, however, 'technique is always secondary and is only important when it is in the service of something larger'.⁵⁸ In commenting on instruction, then, Freire is not primarily dealing with methodological questions at all, but with fundamental ethical and epistemological issues. His well-known critique of the 'banking' conception of education, where teachers seek to transfer knowledge to passive students, addresses the ethical duty of the teacher to learn *with* the students as the latter are encouraged to develop their own independent reading of the world; and it explores the epistemological insight that *knowing* involves a critical inquiry in which the students seek to re-invent the ideas being encountered in the teacher's comments or in the books being read. The liberating teacher, the one who transcends mere instruction, is one who is able to animate the critical response of the student,⁵⁹ whether or not this is done by way of lecturing or other approaches to teaching. Freire warned that 'teachers can all too easily adopt the role of dispenser of knowledge', and he made the point that they need to keep alive the ethical conviction that authoritarian imposition is oppressive and dehumanising.⁶⁰

Release the Imagination

Merely to mention this task, one which has a close affinity with the Freirean notion of reinvention, is to bring to mind the philosophy of Maxine Greene where the place of the imagination in learning and teaching has always been at centre stage.⁶¹ Throughout her work, Greene has been preoccupied with the seemingly ineluctable slide into 'unthinking submergence in the social reality that prevails'.⁶² The world we experience tends to be taken for granted, conventional ideas are accepted at face value, the categories in use remain unchallenged, and the everyday becomes so familiar that it ceases to seem problematic. In the context of education, such unreflective acquiescence is encouraged by teachers' uncritical reliance on slogans and abstractions which, as Greene puts it, dominate imagination. These ancient

images 'too often hang like veils between the teacher and "the phenomenology of the situation".⁶³

Entrapment in the given, the ready-made, and the presuppositions of one's culture means that one's imaginative capacity is unable to break with, and break through, barriers of expectation and prejudice, hence the emphasis on the idea of *releasing* the imagination. In a memorable image, Greene suggests trying to take a stranger's perspective on everyday reality so that one can, in her words, begin to look inquiringly and wonderingly at the world that has for too long been taken for granted. To think of the teacher's task in terms of imagining such alternative possibilities is at once to begin to undermine that dominant conception of meritorious teaching which is preoccupied with questions of efficiency and technical skill.⁶⁴

Greene views the arts, especially literature, as crucial in releasing those imaginative abilities which may help us to connect with other people,⁶⁵ to reveal what is hidden, to find our own silenced voice, and to disrupt the conventional framework. There is nothing inevitable or automatic about this. Literature may be taught and approached in such a way that students are persuaded to believe that they are encountering an authoritative way of viewing the world, not noticing that other perspectives have been excluded, as Greene reveals was the case in her own development.⁶⁶ It is equally true, however, that literature and the arts have the potentiality to allow us to see from different vantage points by making available a range of perspectives and, echoing Freire, Greene speaks of coming to read the world differently as a result of reading literature.

The task for teachers is twofold. In the first place, they need to release their own imagination. Unless they are merely clerks or functionaries, those 'minor technicians' in Scheffler's telling phrase, teachers will be in search of ways in which their work can be improved, including the development of a new conception of what that work is. Greene reminds us that when we are constrained within the boundaries of the apparently inevitable and fixed, it takes imagination to recognise that such a search is even possible. Moreover, the capacity to articulate a vision of how things might be and should be requires teachers to draw on ethical and social imagination which can be the first step towards taking action to bring about change. If teachers are to make appropriate pedagogical decisions, they need to understand how the world looks and feels to their students, and it is imagination which makes it possible, in so far as it is possible at all, to cross what Greene calls 'the empty spaces' which loom between teacher and student. Secondly, the task is to find a way of teaching such that the imaginative capacities of the students are also released. Here Greene speaks of teachers creating situations in which the young are moved to begin to ask 'Why?' as a question for their own reflection, not just to pose to their

teachers. The students have been provoked to go beyond what they have been taught, to explore on their own. If teaching is to lead to students coming to what Greene calls 'openings in experience', then we, as teachers, 'have to experience breaks with what has been established in our own lives; we have to keep arousing ourselves to begin again'.⁶⁷

The term 'release' does not signify that the imagination exists fully formed, ready to pour forth once the barriers are removed. When the barriers are dismantled, what is released is a potentiality for growth which needs stimulus, encouragement, and opportunity. Nor need we conclude, notwithstanding Greene's own fascination with literature and the fine arts, that she would quarrel with Whitehead's observation that there are different types of imaginative functioning which are provoked by different experiences, knowledge and ideas.⁶⁸ Greene speaks, for example, of the need for students to have a sure grasp of the foundations of the particular form of inquiry in question, plus rigorous practice, if imaginative work in that field is to be possible. We must not forget, however, that teaching for imagination needs to ensure that such initial training and instruction merges into empowering if students are ever to go beyond what they have been explicitly taught.⁶⁹

Confront the Hidden Curriculum

Maxine Greene's concern about unthinking submergence in the prevailing social reality leads on quite naturally to a consideration of those learning outcomes which lie hidden from view. Talk of the hidden curriculum gained widespread currency at the end of the 1960s when the phrase was used by Ivan Illich to refer to what he took to be an inevitable consequence of schooling, namely that it conveyed the idea covertly that only what was learned in school was valuable.⁷⁰ The *idea* of the hidden curriculum, of course, was quite familiar to earlier philosophers of education long before the contemporary phrase was coined. It is in evidence in Dewey's remark that everything the teacher does incites the student to respond in some way or other. Dewey reminded us that a teacher's best conscious efforts may be counteracted by influences of which he or she is unaware. Similarly, Russell had a hidden curriculum in mind when he criticised the promotion of superiority and privilege at Eton and Oxford. This may not be their conscious purpose, Russell conceded, but it is nevertheless as strong and effective as one which is explicitly formulated.

In contemporary philosophy of education, of course, the problem of the hidden curriculum has been very widely discussed. No one, however, has done more to explore its far-reaching implications than Jane Roland Martin who provides the clearest and most useful analysis in the literature of the

nature and function of the hidden curriculum.⁷¹ The phenomenon essentially involves the bringing about of a learning state, not necessarily in the context of schooling, which is not openly intended.⁷² There is of necessity some content to a hidden curriculum though not always the *same* content, and the learning state which results may be valuable or harmful. Furthermore, a hidden curriculum is relative to context in the sense that it is *of* some setting, *at* some time, and *for* some learner. Thus, while there may be a dominant hidden curriculum in a particular setting affecting most of the children, there may also be idiosyncratic outcomes for particular learners. It is a consequence of such relativity to context, Martin argues, that the search for hidden curricula is never at an end, and in this way the search becomes part of that on-going reflective practice advocated by Dewey. As teachers on guard for hidden curricula, we need to continually retrace our steps not only because the content of the hidden curriculum may change, as settings and learners change, but also because we ourselves become aware, through consciousness raising, of hidden messages which we too once overlooked. The need for reflective practice could hardly be more apparent.

Martin is explicit about the teacher's task once an undesirable hidden curriculum is identified: 'There can be no doubt that when the hidden curriculum we find contains harmful learning states, we must try to root them out'.⁷³ It seems appropriate, then, to say that the teacher's ongoing task is to *confront* the hidden curriculum because what is involved is an enormously difficult and interminable struggle which will often demand courage. In tackling one unintended learning state, there will surely be others which we have missed; and the one identified may take on new and unnoticed forms. The problematic character of the situation is aggravated by the fact that in trying to root out the hidden curriculum we must recognise that we may end up doing more harm than good; even enlightened reform, Martin points out, can carry with it an undesirable hidden curriculum.

Despite the apparently impossible task, her message to teachers is not one of despair. Although there is no formula which will ensure success, and despite the fact that the matter is complicated inasmuch as other settings outside the classroom also contribute to the same hidden curriculum, there is much that teachers can do especially perhaps in trying to identify and, where possible, modify those conditions and practices which generate the hidden curriculum in the first place. Moreover, following up on Freire's notion of consciousness-raising, Martin reminds us how promoting knowledge and skill in students concerning hidden curricula can be 'a form of self-defence against the onslaught of unasked-for learning states'.⁷⁴ Here the teacher's work will involve trying to develop in students relevant skills, such as becoming better able to detect a hidden curriculum and knowing

how to avoid unwanted learning outcomes, coupled with the development of appropriate attitudes.

The general point here, as Martin herself puts it, is that knowledge can mean power, the truth of which is illustrated in a striking way in her own life and work. Martin illustrates the insidious nature of the hidden curriculum in an autobiographical remark concerning her own early teaching and the exclusion of women's voices: 'So hidden were we that although I had been discussing *Emile* in my own philosophy of education courses, I had no more included Book V (concerning Sophie) on the syllabus than my professors had on theirs'.⁷⁵ Soon after turning her attention to the problem of the hidden curriculum, however, Martin began the work on women for which she is justly renowned and in which she ultimately makes the case for the view that a particular hidden curriculum, one which favours male cognitive perspectives, has entered into the very idea of liberal education which has shaped educational practice over the years. Making the point that confronting this problem will be enormously difficult, Martin writes: 'A curriculum which, through critical analysis, exposes the biased view of women embodied in the disciplines and which, by granting ample space to the study of women shows how unjust that view is, is certainly preferable to a curriculum which, by its silence on the subject, gives students the impression that the ways in which the disciplines look at the world are impartial and unbiased'.⁷⁶

Promote Caring Dispositions

Throughout the preceding discussion, it is abundantly clear that an ethical dimension is firmly embedded in the overall perspective, attitudes and approach which teachers are expected to bring to the particular tasks which have been identified and to their work in general. Consider, for example, Dewey's call for the teacher's sympathetic understanding of individual students; Whitehead's remark that inert ideas are not simply useless, they are harmful; Russell's contempt for the way in which schools attempt to mould the opinions of defenceless children; Passmore's reminder that the critical spirit describes a teacher's character and is not the kind of thing which can be misused; Scheffler's insistence on the need for teachers to give honest answers to students' questions; Freire's idea that education and schooling should have a liberating not a domesticating function; Greene's emphasis on the young being encouraged by their teachers to find their own voices; and Martin's concern to foster the skills, attitudes and values which will help to prevent students from becoming victims of what is offered to them in the name of education. A powerful ethical conviction emerges from this body of work that education must respect students as persons.

In the work of Nel Noddings, the student's own emerging ethical orientation and dispositions become a central focus of the teacher's work: 'Like good parents, teachers should be concerned first and foremost with the kind of people their charges are becoming'.⁷⁷ Noddings reminds us, for example, of the lack of civility in classrooms, not just between teacher and students, but among students themselves, culminating in a school climate where students are afraid of one another and treat each other badly.⁷⁸ She asks us to reflect, for example, on the kinds of 'heroes' teachers often present to students for their admiration and emulation, where success in the pursuit of wealth takes pride of place over fine examples of integrity and fidelity to persons.⁷⁹ She is further concerned that our educational practices, in the form of hidden curricula in literature, history and science courses, as well as the competitive ethos and the hierarchical structure of schools, perpetuate uncritically the influence of the traditional 'warrior code' leading to violence being glorified or seen as a necessary evil, and one's 'enemies' being portrayed as wholly evil.⁸⁰ Echoing Dewey, Noddings observes that everything we do as teachers has moral overtones.⁸¹

Her aim is to return moral education to a central place in the work of schools, a powerful stimulus here being a picture she offers of the contemporary world 'wracked with fighting, killing, vandalism, and psychic pain of all sorts'.⁸² A world, we might add, where incidents reminiscent of the 1964 Kitty Genovese case no longer seem to have the capacity to shock.⁸³ Noddings' contribution has been to advance a revised conception of morality and moral education which can only be intimated here. It accords a prominent place to caring relationships, where the one who cares is fully receptive and attentive to the needs and purposes of the other person; and where the person who is cared for acknowledges and responds to what the carer has done.⁸⁴ In caring, Noddings observes, we listen openly without laying on descriptions and interpretations which reflect our own needs and desires.⁸⁵ Such an emphasis on open listening has important implications for teaching and learning, and is especially important for a community of inquiry in which all participants respect and sustain each other and try to incorporate 'connected knowing' into critical discussions.⁸⁶

The task of promoting caring dispositions involves several components. Teachers model caring behaviour when they treat students with consideration, give them personal attention when it is needed, and try to ensure that their classroom practices are respectful; caring teachers engage in genuine and open dialogue, founded on mutual trust, in which teacher and students feel able to revise and reconsider initial positions and points of view as they retreat from an aggressive and hostile argumentative style and come closer to a form of interpersonal reasoning; progress in developing the dispositions requires appropriate opportunities for practice,

and teachers who take caring seriously will look for activities and arrangements which help such dispositions to flourish, and will carefully monitor the process to ensure that the objectives are being met; and finally, the task involves what Noddings calls confirmation, by which she means bringing out the best in people, finding something worthy in the student so as to hold out to that person an image of himself or herself which is finer than may be apparent, leading ultimately to responsible self-affirmation.⁸⁷

Although associated with the history of women's experience as nurturers, an ethic of caring is presented by Noddings as an appropriate ethical orientation for both men and women because it is rooted in the basic human longing to be cared for. It tries to restore in us that spontaneous (natural) response of concern and solicitude for another person which is not dependent on a sense of duty. It plays down the significance of determining moral principles in favour of a direct response to the person(s) with whom one is in sustained, interpersonal contact, asking oneself such questions as: What does this person need? Am I able to fulfil this need? What effect will my actions have on this person? As Noddings puts it, 'carers must rub elbows with recipients of their care'.⁸⁸

Retire Gracefully

There comes a point when a teacher who is concerned to see his or her student emerge as a self-directed, autonomous individual needs to recognise that it is time to step aside, ready to be consulted from time to time if that is desired, but generally moving beyond the teacher-student relationship in order to allow one's students to find their way on their own. Many philosophers of education have commented on the importance of such a development. Referring to the approach to teaching advocated by Scheffler, R. F. Dearden remarked that as it succeeds, 'so independence of the teacher is gained and more and more valuable self-direction becomes possible'.⁸⁹ Earlier in the twentieth century, in the context of distinguishing teaching and indoctrination, William H. Kilpatrick maintained: 'The teacher's aim must be to make of his pupils and students capable, independent thinkers. He must be very much on his guard lest those under him build dependence on him'.⁹⁰

Indoctrination, of course, necessarily carries with it a sense of on-going dependence and control, and it is not surprising that it is in the context of a discussion of indoctrination that we find perhaps the most memorable statement of the teacher's responsibility to work at trying to ensure that in the end he or she is addressing an equal, someone who has outgrown the initial need to have a teacher present. R. M. Hare put it this way: 'It is by the readiness to retire gracefully, indeed, that we can most easily tell the educator from the indoctrinator ... the educator is trying to turn children

into adults; the indoctrinator is trying to make them into perpetual children'.⁹¹ Hare's famous phrase, 'adolescents into adults',⁹² very effectively captures the idea of developing into an independent-minded person capable of thinking for oneself. And he sees the true teacher, the educator, as the person who is pleased when this happens; we can tell, he says, by the expression on the teacher's face which side of the fence they are on. Hare makes it clear that this does not mean trying to avoid influencing children, even (especially) in controversial areas such as moral education. What is crucial, however, is that our influence should not amount to trying to stop the growth of the capacity to think for oneself.

Paradoxically, then, one important task for the teacher is to recognise when the time for teaching this child or these students is over, when further work would only interfere with the opportunity people need to go it alone or to decide for themselves when they need to seek out a teacher. To ignore this task is to run the risk of undoing whatever good might have emerged from pursuing the various tasks outlined earlier.⁹³

NOTES

1. Bertrand Russell, 'Knowledge and wisdom', in John G. Slater (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, I Vol. 11, London: Routledge, 1997: 453.
2. A. N. Whitehead, 'John Dewey and his influence', in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, Evanston: Northwestern University, 1939: 478.
3. I hasten to add that I am not suggesting that the philosophers whose work I draw upon share a common view of teaching. Nevertheless, the ideas singled out for attention here could, I believe, all be incorporated into an integrated philosophy of teaching; and there are, as I shall illustrate, echoes from one philosopher to another which could be explored much more fully. I hardly need to point out that, typically, a number of philosophers have discussed the task which is here associated with a particular philosopher. I should also add that I am not claiming to have identified what each of these philosophers would regard as the single, most important pedagogical task nor even that, in every case, they would want to identify any particular task as *the* central one for teachers. The claim is the more modest one that the task in question is regarded as very important by the philosopher with whom it is associated here. I might also observe that a list of tasks such as this is not at odds with the point that circumstances and contexts play a crucial role in determining what teachers need to do. Many of the tasks examined here are extremely relevant, however, to the challenge of making decisions in specific situations.
4. It should be clear that I am not, in this context, developing a general account of the virtues and qualities a teacher should possess. I have attempted to do so in my *What Makes A Good Teacher* London, ON: Althouse Press, 1993. In the present discussion, the focus is on what the teacher should *do*, rather than on the kind of person the teacher needs to be, but there are inevitably some links and connections.

5. John Dewey, 'Democracy in education', in Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), *John Dewey, The Middle Works, 1899-1924* Vol. 3, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977: 231.
6. John Dewey, 'Judgement', in Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), *John Dewey, The Middle Works, 1899-1924* Vol. 7, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1979: 262-4.
7. There can be no doubt, I think, that Dewey anticipated the idea of the reflective practitioner which has become something of a slogan in recent years. The fact that the term gained such prominence as a rallying cry in the 1980s and beyond suggests that the problem identified by Dewey remains with us today. Admittedly, by the 1930s, Dewey felt that the very dismal condition of teacher passivity described in his 1903 paper, 'Democracy in education' op. cit., had improved to some extent. See Dewey, 'Democracy and educational administration', *Problems of Men* New York: Philosophical Library, 1946:57-69. Nevertheless, contemporary observers of schools and teachers report that it is still all too common for teachers to complain that their *voice* is ignored. While deploring the dictation of rules from on high, Dewey was very much in favour of teachers *sharing* their insights and findings with other teachers. See Dewey, 'Progressive education and the science of education', in Reginald D. Archambault (ed.), *John Dewey on Education*, New York: Random House, 1964:169-81.
8. Dewey, 'Democracy in education', op. cit.: 234.
9. John Dewey, 'Social purposes in education', reprinted in Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), *John Dewey, The Middle Works, 1899-1924* Vol. 15, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983: 163. This pinpoints one reason for doubting the wisdom of restricting the aims of schooling to socialisation, as Richard Rorty has suggested.
10. Dewey, 'Democracy and educational administration', in *Problems of Men*, op. cit.: 65. The significance of a sense of judgement in the performance pedagogical tasks will be evident at various points throughout. See also my discussion of judgement in *What Makes A Good Teacher*, op. cit.: ch. 9.
11. See Terence H. McLaughlin, 'Beyond the reflective teacher', *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 31, 1, 1999: 13. McLaughlin cautions that this view of Dewey should not be pushed too far. I would add that Dewey states explicitly, after setting out the five phases of reflection, that 'no set rules can be laid down on such matters'. See John Dewey, *How We Think* (2nd. ed. 1933), reprinted in Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), *John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953* Vol. 8, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986: 207.
12. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* New York: The Free Press, 1966 (1916): 303-4. (Dewey speaks of 'pupils' here to refer to younger children. I use the term 'students' to refer to learners at all age levels.)
13. John Dewey, *How We Think* (2nd ed. 1933), Boydston (ed.), *John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953*, Vol. 8, op. cit.: 159. (The whole quotation is italicised in original.)
14. John Dewey, 'The relation of theory to practice in education', in Archambault (ed.), *John Dewey on Education*, op. cit.: 320.
15. John Dewey, *Experience and Education*, New York: Collier Books, 1963 (1938): 71.
16. John Dewey, *The School and Society*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963 (1900): 130. Dewey also speaks of native tact and skill as 'the intuitive

- power that comes mainly from sympathy'. See 'What psychology can do for the teacher', reprinted in Archambault (ed.), *John Dewey on Education*, op. cit.: 1964.
17. John Dewey, *The Child and the Curriculum*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963 (1902): 14.
 18. John Dewey, *Experience and Education*, op. cit.: 39.
 19. Dewey, *Experience and Education*, op. cit.: 38-9.
 20. These Deweyan ideas find an echo in Paulo Freire's reminder that 'the progressive educator must always be moving out on his or her own'. See Paulo Freire (ed.) *Mentoring the Mentor: A Critical Dialogue with Paulo Freire*, New York: Peter Lang, 1997: 308.
 21. John Dewey, 'What psychology can do for the teacher', in Archambault (ed.), *John Dewey on Education*, op. cit.: 1964.
 22. A. N. Whitehead, *An Introduction to Mathematics*, London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1911: 61.
 23. A. N. Whitehead, 'Harvard: the future', in *Atlantic Monthly*, 158, 3, 1936: 266.
 24. Lucien Price, *Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead*, New York: Mentor Books, 1964: 25. See also p. 56.
 25. A. N. Whitehead, 'Memories', *Atlantic Monthly*, 157, 6, 1936: 678
 26. Price, *Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead*, op. cit.: 56.
 27. Price, *Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead*, op. cit.: 244.
 28. Whitehead, 'John Dewey and his influence', in Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, op. cit.: 478.
 29. Whitehead, 'Harvard: The future', op. cit.: 265.
 30. Op. cit.: 267.
 31. Whitehead, *The Aims of Education*, New York: The Free Press, 1967 (1929): 4.
 32. cf. Dewey's view that 'guidance given by the teacher to the exercise of the pupils' intelligence is an aid to freedom, not a restriction upon it'. See *Experience and Education*, op. cit.: 71.
 33. Bertrand Russell, 'John Stuart Mill', in *Portraits from Memory*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956.
 34. I put 'truths' in scare quotes, somewhat reluctantly given what Susan Haack quite rightly describes as 'an astonishing outbreak of sneer quotes', in order to reflect Russell's point that what is offered as truth is often distortion and falsehoods. See Susan Haack, *Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998: 92.
 35. Each of the philosophers represented here would agree, I believe, that the teacher has an important role in introducing students to substantive bodies of knowledge, and that view is taken for granted in the discussion of the particular tasks examined here. The challenge is to teach and present content knowledge in such a way that the intellectual and moral virtues characteristic of the educated person are fostered. The particular tasks singled out in this account may be seen as ways of trying to ensure that this occurs.
 36. Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* London: Unwin Books, 1971 (1916): 107.
 37. Bertrand Russell, 'Freedom versus authority in education', in Russell, *Sceptical Essays*, London: Unwin, 1977 (1928): 149.
 38. Bertrand Russell, 'Philosophy', in Slater (ed.), *Collected Papers* Vol. 11, op. cit.: 222. (An incomplete paper, probably written in 1945.)
 39. Shelagh Crooks, 'Developing the critical attitude', *Teaching Philosophy*, 18, 4,

- 1995: 313-25.
40. Susan Haack, *Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate*, op. cit., especially ch. 1.
 41. For further discussion of this issue, see David Carr (ed.), *Education, Knowledge and Truth: Beyond the Postmodern Impasse*, London: Routledge, 1998.
 42. John Passmore, 'On teaching to be critical', in R. S. Peters (ed.), *The Concept of Education*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967: 192-211. The notion of critical thinking is germane to a number of the tasks being considered here. For a comprehensive discussion, see Harvey Siegel, *Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking, and Education*, New York: Routledge, 1988.
 43. John Passmore, 'Educating for the 21st century', The Fourth Wallace Wurth Memorial Lecture, Sydney: University of New South Wales, 1985: 4.
 44. Passmore, 'On teaching to be critical', in Peters (ed.), *The Concept of Education*, 206.
 45. John Passmore, 'On teaching to be critical', op. cit.: 207. Paulo Freire reports a similar frustration expressed by peasants who said that if the teacher explains the pictures 'it'll take less time and won't give us a headache'. See Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, New York: Continuum, 1982: 50.
 46. In similar vein, John Dewey's emphasised 'the development of a spirit of curiosity that will keep the student in an attitude of inquiry', and observed that 'the basic trouble with much teaching...is that it does not create wants in the mind, wants in the sense of demands that will go on operating on their own initiative'. Dewey was dismayed that 'problems are brought up but only that they may be solved and put to bed. There is current the opinion that the only alternative to this course is to leave the students' minds in a state of confusion.' See Dewey, 'Education and the social order', in Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), *John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925-1953* Vol. 9, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986: 175-85.
 47. John Passmore, 'Explanation in everyday life, in science, and in history', in *History and Theory*, 2, 1962: 105-23.
 48. A good example of a teacher who understands the value of puzzlement is Sister Michael, whose work is described by TheodoreSizer: 'The students left the class off balance, pondering'. See Sizer, *Horace's Compromise*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984: 145.
 49. Israel Scheffler, 'University scholarship and the education of teachers', in Scheffler, *Reason and Teaching*, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973: 87.
 50. Scheffler, *The Language of Education*, Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1960: 57.
 51. That teaching is a process which occurs *over time* needs to be taken into account before concluding that the rationality theory of teaching would imply that Pestalozzi's Gertrude was not teaching *at all* when giving her young children moral advice. See Jane Roland Martin, 'Excluding women from the educational realm', reprinted in Martin, *Changing the Educational Landscape*, New York: Routledge, 1994: 43.
 52. Freire, op. cit.. 309.
 53. Freire, op. cit.. 324.
 54. Ira Shor and Paulo Freire, *A Pedagogy of Liberation: Dialogues on Transforming Education*, South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and Garvey, 1987: 69. This and subsequent references to this book are to comments made by Freire in a dialogue with Shor.

55. Shor and Freire, op. cit. 71-2.
56. Shor and Freire, op. cit. 180.
57. Paulo Freire, 'Reading the world and reading the word', in William Hare and John P. Portelli (eds.), *Philosophy of Education: Introductory Readings*, 2nd. ed. Calgary: Detselig, 1996: 187. Not frustrating one's students is, of course, quite compatible with Passmore's notion of puzzling them.
58. Paulo Freire, *Mentoring the Mentor*, op. cit.: 304.
59. Shor and Freire, op. cit.: 40. For an excellent discussion of 'certain fundamental moral principles in Freire's philosophy, see Peter Roberts, 'Knowledge, dialogue and humanisation: The moral philosophy of Paulo Freire', *Journal of Educational Thought*, 32, 2, 1998: 95-117.
60. Freire, *Mentoring the Mentor*, op. cit.: 315. On the danger of slipping into the 'banking' mode, we might recall Passmore's comment that 'it might almost be regarded as an educational law that all subjects tend towards an instructional state'. See 'On teaching to be critical', op. cit.: 202.
61. Maxine Greene, *Releasing the Imagination* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995. For evidence of her long-term engagement with this project, see her 1965 essay 'Real toads and imaginary gardens', reprinted in Adrian Dupuis (ed.), *Nature, Aims, and Policy: Readings in the Philosophy of Education*, Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1970: 296-308; and her most recent essay, 'Imagining futures: the public school and possibility', *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 32, 2, 2000: 267-80.
62. Maxine Greene, *Teacher as Stranger: Educational Philosophy for the Modern Age*, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1973: 269.
63. Greene, *Teacher as Stranger*, op. cit.: 80.
64. Maxine Greene, 'A philosophic look at merit and mastery in teaching', *Elementary School Journal* 86, 1, 1985: 17-26.
65. Greene helps us 'to recognise a more adequate notion of 'transcending' difference. It is not a matter of setting aside differences of gender, class and race in search of a common 'cultural literacy', but rather of reaching beyond our acknowledged differences to try to see things from another perspective. She speaks of literature as providing those shocks of awareness, that rupture with the familiar, which may release us from our own favoured vantage point. See *Releasing the Imagination*, op. cit.: ch. 9.
66. Greene, *Releasing the Imagination*, op. cit.: 114.
67. Greene, *Releasing the Imagination*, op. cit.: 109.
68. A. N. Whitehead, *A Philosopher Looks at Science*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1965: 47.
69. Maxine Greene, 'A philosophic look at merit and mastery in teaching', op. cit.: 22.
70. Ivan Illich, *Deschooling Society*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973.
71. Jane R. Martin, 'What should we do with a hidden curriculum when we find one?', *Curriculum Inquiry*, 6, 2, 1976: 135-51. Reprinted in Martin, *Changing the Educational Landscape*, op. cit.: 154-69. Subsequent references are to the latter work. Martin claims, p. 158, that a hidden curriculum is not something one just finds; one must go in search of it. In general, this may be true, but there is no reason in principle why a hidden curriculum could not suddenly be noticed even though one had not set out to find it; and sometimes such insights do come unexpectedly.
72. Martin adds a number of helpful qualifications: (i) what is not openly intended

covers (a) that which is hidden because it is unknown, and (b) that which is hidden because it has been concealed; (ii) what is not openly intended ceases to be part of the hidden curriculum once students recognise what they are learning; (iii) what is not intended by the teacher may well have been secretly intended by others who have some control over the learning situation.

73. Martin, *op. cit.*: 164.
74. *Op. cit.*: 167.
75. Martin, *Changing the Educational Landscape*, *op. cit.*: 11.
76. See Martin's 1981 essay 'The ideal of the educated person', reprinted in Martin, *Changing the Educational Landscape*, *op. cit.*: 81.
77. Nel Noddings, 'Stories in dialogue: caring and interpersonal reasoning', in Carol Witherall and Nel Noddings (eds.), *Stories Lives Tell: Narrative and Dialogue in Education*, New York: Teachers College Press, 1991: 169. There is an echo here of Socrates' concern with the development of the human and social qualities in education. See Plato, *Apology* 20B.
78. Nel Noddings, 'Caring and competence', in Gary A. Griffin (ed.), *The Education of Teachers* (Ninety-eighth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education), Chicago: NSSE, 1999: 205-20. 'Treating others badly' is no doubt an understatement given what we are now learning about bullying and harassment in schools.
79. Nel Noddings, *Women and Evil*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989: 240.
80. Nel Nodding, 'Do we really want to produce good people?', *Journal of Moral Education*, 16, 3, 1987: 177-88. One is reminded of Russell's condemnation of the bigoted nationalism embedded in school texts which encouraged hatred of others and a willingness to fight. See, for example, Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, *op. cit.*: 105.
81. Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984: 179.
82. See Nel Noddings, *Caring* *op. cit.*: 1. It is worth noting that an ethic of caring is foreshadowed in Russell's emphasis on 'kindly feeling' and in his view that 'the most important of all qualifications in a teacher is the feeling of spontaneous affection towards those whom he teaches'. See Bertrand Russell, 'Education for democracy', *Proceedings of the National Education Association* 77, 1939: 534.
83. Dozens of neighbours overheard or witnessed the assault on Kitty Genovese but none summoned the police or came to the victim's aid. See Martin Gansberg, '38 who saw murder didn't call police', *The New York Times* 27 March 1964.
84. Places in the relationship are, of course, often exchanged.
85. Noddings, 'Caring and competence', in Griffin (ed.), *The Education of Teachers*, *op. cit.*: 206.
86. The 'community of inquiry' notion is closely associated with the work of Matthew Lipman on philosophy for children. See, for example, Lipman, *Philosophy Goes To School*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988; the idea of 'connected knowing' has been explored by Blythe McVicker Clinchy in 'On critical thinking and connected knowing', in Kerry S. Walters (ed.), *Rethinking Reason*, New York: SUNY, 1994: 33-42.
87. For an illustration of this point, see Vickie Dodds Urban, 'Eugene's story: A case of caring', *Educational Leadership*, 56, 6, 1999: 69-70.
88. Nel Noddings, *Philosophy of Education*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview press,

- 1995: 188. In playing down principles, however, Noddings goes too far in maintaining that it is a consequence of universalizability, which seeks to arrive at moral conclusions which have general application, that 'who we are, to whom we are connected, what our projects are, what our situation is—are all irrelevant'. None of this follows from universalizability. See my discussion in *What Makes A Good Teacher*, op. cit.: 107.
89. R. F. Dearden, *The Philosophy of Primary Education*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968: 129.
 90. William H. Kilpatrick, 'Philosophy of education from the experimentalist outlook', in Nelson B. Henry (ed.), *Philosophies of Education* (Forty-first Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education Part 1), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942: 84.
 91. R. M. Hare, 'Adolescents into adults', in R. M. Hare, *Essays on Religion and Education*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992: 130. Similarly, Freire warned of the danger of the educator maintaining his or her position of being needed by the oppressed. See Freire (ed.), *Mentoring the Mentor*, op. cit.: 307.
 92. Jacques Barzun employed a related image, pupils into students, when remarking that the whole aim of good teaching is to turn the learner into an independent, self-propelling person. See Barzun, *Teacher in America*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946: 21.
 93. Earlier versions of this paper were read at the University of Cyprus and Cambridge University in March 2000. I am grateful to all those who offered suggestions and comments on those occasions.